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The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European Union 
in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of attention. The 
scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two areas of research 
have been prioritized:
1/ The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications 
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe 
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This paper was written within the project on The Eastward Enlargement of the 
European Union: the Cases of the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
which was set up by the Robert Schuman Centre through the support of the 
Academy of Finland. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 























































































































































































The protection of human rights and respect for national minorities appears at the 
top of the list of the European Union’s (EU) accession criteria. While this reflects 
the EU’s long-standing commitment to promoting human rights outside its 
borders, it is no easy task to legally determine the standard of human rights the 
EU will require applicant countries to meet prior to accession. EU accession 
demands that applicant countries exhibit the values shared by the member states. 
Yet, the promotion and protection of human rights does not figure among the 
objectives listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).1 Although 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been the leading institution for 
determining what EU rights are, it has restricted its decisions to cases in which 
EU laws raise human rights issues and has avoided imposing a European human 
rights standard on member states’ actions.2
Despite the lack of a clear human rights agenda, more than any other 
international organization, the EU has made a clear impact on raising the standard 
of human rights in the Baltic States. This influence has been particularly apparent 
in the Baltic States’ policies towards the protection of national minorities and 
citizenship policies. Although organizations such as the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have criticized the 
Baltic States’ policies towards their Russian-speaking resident populations, they 
have had little effect. The first section of this paper will address how the legal 
process by which the Baltic States regained their independence restricted the 
application of certain international human rights norms in these countries. It will 
be seen that due to their peculiar context, the Baltic States were able to bypass 
certain conventions of international law pertaining to citizenship.
The second part of this paper will address the EU accession process and, in 
particular, the disparity between the lack of an EU human rights agenda and the 
relatively high human rights conditions placed on the applicant countries. 
Furthermore, certain EU accession requirements reflect a higher standard of 
human rights protection than currently practiced by certain member states. It will 
be shown that despite this disparity, the Baltic States have made clear attempts to 
meet these criteria in a relatively short period of time. In conclusion, I will posit 
that by raising human rights accession criteria, the EU is attempting to build the 
foundation for increased political unity and the possibility of adopting an EU 




























































































Baltic Independence: State Continuity versus Secession
In their attempt to break free of the USSR, the Baltic States followed two distinct 
‘paths’ to independence. While the Estonians attempted to secede from the USSR 
based on soviet law, the Lithuanians and Latvians based their strategy on the 
internationally-recognized illegality of the soviet occupation of the Baltics and 
asserted their states’ continuity. Although their strategies were different, 
communication between the three soviet satellites was good and their aims were 
unified, making it possible to exchange information on the progress of their 
independent attempts to leave the USSR. The idea was that by acting 
independently and taking alternate routes to independence, one of the three might 
finally succeed in gaining independence, thereby clearing a legal precedent for the 
other states to follow. Thus, when Estonia’s attempt to secede from the USSR 
failed due to amendments made to the Soviet Constitution, It was able to abandon 
that strategy and quickly catch up with Latvia and Lithuania in their attempt to re­
establish the legality of their inter-war republics. This strategy was ultimately 
successful, though it had the unfortunate effect of rendering tens of thousands of 
people residing in those countries stateless.
Gorbachev’s glosnost program and the subsequent deletion of Art. 6 of the 
Soviet Republics’ Constitutions (which granted the Communist Party primacy) 
opened the door to pluralist elections. As a result, party-like pro-independence 
organizations were created - the Sajudis in Lithuania, the Estonian Popular Front, 
and the People’s Front in Latvia - which ran in opposition to the Communist Party 
in the March 1990 elections to the national Supreme Soviets. The electoral results 
gave substantial majorities to each of the three opposition parties, and so the 
newly-elected leaders interpreted the results as quasi-referendums for 
independence, and took steps accordingly.3
Immediately following elections, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a 
Declaration of Independence from the USSR on March 11, 1990. In order to 
formally bridge the fifty-year gap between the internationally recognized 
constitutional democracy that existed during the inter-war period, Sajudis leaders 
immediately reinstated the 1938 Constitution (the last of three constitutions 
adopted during the 22-year inter-war independence period).4 There were two 
reasons for this largely symbolic act. First, after its declaration of independence, 
no influential Western democracy acknowledged the Republic of Lithuania. 
Therefore, Lithuanian leaders continued to work as they had, making sure that no 
legal loophole remained which Moscow might find to draw Lithuania back into 
its net. Secondly, because the Lithuanian Communist Party was cooperating with 
Sajudis in the goal for independence, it had not lost its public credibility or 




























































































Constitution as the basis for an independent “Lithuanian Soviet Republic.” 
Sajudis needed to assure the West that it was determined to create a liberal 
democracy in Lithuania. Thus, by re-instating the inter-war Constitution, Sajudis 
hoped to reassure the West of its intentions to abandon communism. Less than 
one hour after the reinstallation of the 1938 Constitution, the Lithuanian Supreme 
Soviet adopted the Provisional Basic Law, which served as an interim 
constitution for nearly two years. In an effort to avoid calling new elections and 
to maintain the stability of the current government, the Basic Law resembled the 
Lithuanian Soviet Constitution in its provisions concerning institutions and power 
structures.
This move was quickly copied by the Latvian Supreme Soviet, which 
adopted the Declaration on the Renewal of Independence on May 4, 1990 and 
reinstated the 1922 Constitution.5 Both the Lithuanian and Latvian declarations 
asserted the illegal nature of the August 23, 1939 treaty between Germany and 
the USSR which led to the loss of sovereignty of the three Baltic States. More 
importantly, the United States and other western democracies had for many years 
openly acknowledged that the Baltic States were in fact illegally annexed by the 
USSR. On this basis, both countries claimed their right to reestablish their 
sovereignty. It is interesting to note that Latvia’s declaration guaranteed the 
protection of social, economic, cultural and political rights of “citizens of the 
Republic of Latvia and those of other nations permanently residing in Latvia,” 
including “those citizens of the USSR who express the desire to continue living in 
the territory of Latvia.”6 Subsequent policies regarding citizenship rights will be 
seen later in this paper to reflect a clear turn-around of this policy.
Meanwhile, the newly-elected Estonian government issued a more 
moderate declaration on the “Transition Period for Independence” on March 30, 
1990. The Estonian Popular Front, which won an overwhelming majority in the 
1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet, chose an alternate route towards 
independence which preferred working within soviet institutions.7 They hoped to 
take advantage of Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution, which proclaimed that 
“each union republic retains the right freely to secede from the USSR.”
The first blow to the separatist aims of the Baltic republics was felt with 
the deletion of Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution by the central government. 
Gorbachev promised to consider amendments to the USSR Constitution that 
would allow the eventual secession of Soviet republics from the USSR, but 
ultimately these measures demanded that the all-union legislature vote on any bid 
to secede,8 thus placing a sizable hurdle in the path to independence. It 
particularly stymied Estonia, which relied on this article in its declaration of 




























































































achieved throughout the USSR on the issue of Baltic secession. But the 
constitutional amendment did not effect the legal status of Latvia’s and 
Lithuania’s declarations of independence. Nevertheless, these declarations had 
only symbolic significance at the time, since neither the USSR nor the 
international community recognized these states.
After several months of anxious waiting, the August 1991 putsch in 
Moscow offered a window of opportunity. Taking advantage of the chaos, Latvia 
and Lithuania reasserted their declarations of independence and Estonia quickly 
drafted the “Resolution on the National Independence of Estonia”, on August 20, 
1991. With the collapse of the USSR, western democracies began to formally 
recognize the Baltic States’ independence, and the three states began the next 
phase of institution building and democratic consolidation.
Soviet Era Migration
Despite the assertions of legal continuity by the Baltic States, fifty years of Soviet 
rule had made a lasting impact on every aspect of these societies which were 
impossible to ignore. The problems posed by soviet-era migration in particular 
brought up ethical problems. Soviet ideology strongly supported the creation of 
cosmopolitan societies and frowned upon nationalistic sentiments. State policies 
were developed and implemented largely according to these aspirations.9 The 
Russian language was the basic administrative language of the USSR and while 
families in the soviet republics had a choice between sending children to Russian 
and native language schools, graduates of Russian schools (in combination with 
Communist Party membership) surely gave individuals a privileged position in 
terms of securing good jobs or a university education. Moreover, the Russian 
language was a requisite course in all native-language schools.
More stringent measures were taken as well to manufacture cosmopolitan 
cities through forced migration within the USSR. Policies under Stalin were the 
most brutal, in the sense that force was clearly used to strip the ‘bourgeoisie’ of 
their property and to send them far from their native republics. The fortunate were 
able to emigrate to the West but thousands of people were murdered or forced to 
migrate within Soviet territory. Baltic State residents were particularly targeted as 
anti-soviet, with the result that tens of thousands of ethnic Estonians, Latvians 
and Lithuanians emigrated from their native countries. At the same time, 
incentives were given to ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and other 
groups to migrate to the Baltic States, as soviet-era industrialization of the Baltic 
states demanded a large work force to support these initiatives. The result was 
that the number of ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians dropped 




























































































ethnic Estonians, 169,000 ethnic Latvians, and 267,000 Lithuanians vanished 
from census data in 25 years.10
Citizenship Policies in the Baltic States11
Lithuania
Even before its declaration of independence from the USSR on March 11, 1990, 
Lithuania adopted its first citizenship law on November 3, 1989. This law 
enabled all permanent residents of the territory to gain Lithuanian citizenship, 
regardless of ethnicity, language, religion, or employment status.12 By the 
November 3, 1991 deadline for registration, 90 percent of all residents opted to 
become Lithuanian citizens.13 A second law on citizenship was passed on 
December 5, 1991, which entitled all citizens and permanent residents of 
Lithuania before June 15 1940 and their descendants to become citizens of the 
newly independent state. The 1991 law also laid down the criteria for 
naturalization of new citizens. One may acquire citizenship by birth or by 
naturalization. Rights of children are protected to the extent that children of 
Lithuanian citizens (Arts. 9-8), children of non-citizens permanently residing in 
Lithuania (Art. 10), and children bom or found on the territory of Lithuania 
whose parents are unknown (Art. 11) are entitled to gain automatic citizenship of 
Lithuania. Naturalization of adults must follow after certain conditions are met 
(Art. 12). An applicant must pass a written and oral examination of the Lithuanian 
language and the basic provisions of the Constitution, have lived in Lithuania for 
at least 10 years, and have a permanent place of employment or a constant legal 
source of support. Although there is no mention in the law itself prohibiting 
members of the former soviet army from gaining citizenship, the Constitutional 
Court has ruled that without special consent of the government, they do not 
qualify as permanent residents and therefore are not entitled to citizenship.14
It will become clear after the citizenship legislation of Latvia and Estonia 
have been reviewed that the Lithuanian citizenship policy is relatively liberal in 
comparison to the other two Baltic States. Indeed, whereas “the Baltic States” are 
often invoked as having human rights and ethical shortcomings in terms of their 
citizenship policies, Lithuania cannot be included in such statements. Yet, the 
justification for the inclusion of Lithuania in this study is two-fold. First, 
Lithuanian leaders were more interested in building a new democratic state than 
relying too much on Lithuania’s (problematic) inter-war democratic legacy.15 
Second, in exploring the reasons behind this seemingly generous policy towards 
non-ethnic Lithuanians it is important to state that the ‘russification’ of Lithuania 
was executed to a far less degree than in either Estonia or Latvia. The total 
proportion of ethnic Lithuanians remained relatively unchanged since the inter­




























































































percentage of ethnic Latvians and Estonians in their respective countries between 
the 1930s and the 1990s is more profound: in 1935 the percentage of ethnic 
Latvians was 75.5 while in 1995 that percentage had dropped to 55.1; in 1934 
Estonia, the ethnic majority made up 88 percent of the population, while in 1989, 
the percentage was 61.5.16 Therefore, the fact Lithuanians felt that they could 
accommodate a sizable proportion of non-Lithuanians (around 20 percent) 
without sacrificing their democratic ambitions, sovereignty, or native language 
and culture was decisive in their decision to adopt a relatively liberal policy on 
citizenship.
Latvia
While Lithuania and Estonia (see below) chose to rebuild their new democracies 
from scratch by adopting completely new constitutions, Latvia valued the concept 
of state continuity to an extreme by keeping the 1922 Constitution in force. To 
compensate for its short length and important missing elements (for example, it 
contained no mention of human rights), the Constitution was buttressed by a 
series of constitutional laws, including the May 4, 1990 Declaration on the 
Accession to Human Rights Instruments and the Law on the Rights and 
Obligations of a Citizen and Person of December 10 1991. Nevertheless, these 
measures were inadequate because of the absence of a law defining the status of 
constitutional laws vis-à-vis ordinary legislation. This meant that courts had no 
indicators for deciding on cases in which the rights law contradicted other laws 
issued by the Saeima (parliament). Eventually, the Saeima adopted several 
amendments to the 1922 Constitution which finally paved the way for judicial 
remedies for human rights infractions.17 On June 12, 1996, the Saeima adopted a 
constitutional amendment establishing a Constitutional Court. The Saeima 
eventually adopted an entirely new Section 8 of the Constitution in October 1998, 
which constitutionalized fundamental rights.
In the spirit of the principle of state continuity, in 1991 Latvian leaders 
reinstated the 1919 Citizenship Law (as amended in 1927), which granted 
individuals who possessed Latvian citizenship prior to 1940 automatic citizenship 
in the restored Latvian state. The “Resolution on the Renewal of the Republic of 
Latvia, Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization” stated that 
the restored state considered the 1940 USSR law on citizenship null and void,18 
thus rendering thousands of residents of Latvian territory stateless. This measure 
was justified by the argument that since the Latvian state never legally ceased to 
exist, only those who were truly members of the inter-war state and their 
descendants had the right to participate politically in state recreation. These 
‘original’ citizens were thus the only residents of post-1991 Latvia entitled to 




























































































only 64 percent of the resident population actually participated in the 1993 
elections.19
Finally, on July 22, 1994 a new law on citizenship was adopted by the 
Saeima. This law reiterated the fact that pre-1940 citizens and their descendants 
are entitled to citizenship and laid down the ground rules for naturalization, but it 
also granted citizenship to individuals who were permanent residents of pre-1919 
Latvia (the date of Latvian inter-war state creation). Unlike Lithuania, Latvia 
made special provisions to encourage Latvian émigrés to repatriate. The 
“Transitional Provisions” of the 1994 law allow inter-war citizens of the Republic 
of Latvia to gain citizenship without renouncing their current citizenship. 
Citizenship was also granted upon registration to soviet-era immigrants of 
Estonian and Lithuanian ethnicity, to non-ethnic Latvians who finished Latvian 
language secondary schools, and to spouses (for at least 10 years) of Latvian 
citizens (Art. 13).
Article 10 of the 1994 law indicates who may not acquire citizenship of 
Latvia, even through naturalization. This group includes:
- those who have “turned against the Republic of Latvia’s independence, 
its democratic parliamentary state system or the existing state authority 
in Latvia, if such has been established by a court decree”
- those who since May 4, 1990 have stirred ethnic hatred or racial 
discord through the propagation of fascist, chauvinist, national-socialist, 
communist, or other totalitarian ideas;
- officials of foreign states, those who have served in the armed forces or 
police of a foreign state (including the USSR) who were not permanent 
residents of Latvia prior to their conscription;
- those who have been employees, informants, or agents of the KGB or 
any other foreign security service;
- those who have been convicted of a crime and imprisoned for more than 
one year;
- ' and those who participated in the attempts to stop the independence
movement after January 13, 1991 through their participation in the 
Latvian Communist Party, Working Peoples’ International Front of the 
Latvian SSR, United Council of Labor Collectives, Organization of War 
and Labor Veterans, or the All-Latvia Salvation Committee and its 
regional committees.
All other residents wishing to gain Latvian citizenship are required to go through 
naturalization procedures. These procedures require establishing permanent 




























































































the Latvian language, history and the national anthem, and knowing the basic 
principles of the Constitution and the constitutional law on “Rights and 
Obligations of a Citizen and a Person” (Art. 12). Chapter III of the law describes 
the language exam, which includes testing the applicant on his or her ability read, 
speak, and write in Latvian on topics from everyday life. It also states that the 
disabled and the elderly are exempt from taking this exam Applicants must also 
show proof of a legal source of income and renounce their former 
citizenship.(Art. 12)
To prevent what Latvian parliamentarians believed would be a run on the 
naturalization office, the 1994 law also instituted a “windows” system for 
naturalization (Art. 14). This law distinguished applicants for citizenship by age 
and whether or not applicants were bom in Latvia and separated them into eight 
groups accordingly. The first group (those bom in Latvia who were 16-20 years 
of age at the time of their application) were scheduled to begin naturalization 
procedures on January 1, 1996. The eighth set of applicants (those bom outside 
of Latvia and are over 30 years of age) could not begin the naturalization 
procedures until January 1, 2003.
Unsurprisingly, due to the strict new citizenship law, the number of 
registered Latvian residents who gained citizenship between 1995 and 1997 rose 
by only 1.4 percent leaving at least 28 percent of registered residents stateless.20 
In the face of international pressure to end the condition of statelessness within its 
borders, Latvia stood by its citizenship policy and asserted its legality due to state 
continuity. Instead of amending its citizenship policies, the Latvian parliament 
adopted a special law on “Status of Former USSR Citizens who have Neither 
Latvian nor Other States’ Citizenship” of April 12, 1995. This law applies to only 
those resident non-citizens who qualify for citizenship through naturalization, thus 
excluding former soviet army personnel and their families. This law states that 
stateless persons who have registered with the government enjoy the same rights 
as Latvian citizens according to the constitutional law on “Rights and Obligations 
of a Person and a Citizen” (Art. 2). Moreover, the law also confirms that resident 
non-citizens have the right to travel freely; are able to admit their spouses and 
dependents into Latvia; maintain their native language and culture; and to receive 
translation services in court proceedings. The law also stipulates that resident 
non-citizens will not be exiled or expelled from the territory of Latvia except 
according to law or when a foreign state agrees to receive them
Estonia
Like the Latvians, Estonia strictly followed the principle of continuity in re­
establishing its democratic state, though to a lesser extent. After the Moscow 




























































































of Estonia”, the Estonian parliament immediately began working on a new 
constitution. Moreover, as in Latvia and Lithuania at the time, the struggle for 
independence was linked to democratic intentions and guarantees that no attempts 
would be made to restrict citizenship of the independent republic on the basis of 
ethnic origin.21 However, the new Constitution betrayed these initial intentions. 
The Estonian Constitution, adopted by referendum in 1992, included guarantees 
for the protection of minorities, but also guaranteed social rights to resident non­
citizens. Article 28 of the Estonian Constitution stipulates “All persons shall have 
the right to health care. Estonian citizens shall be entitled to state assistance in the 
case of old age, inability to work, loss of a provider, and need. . .this right shall 
exist equally for Estonian citizens, and citizens of foreign states and state-less 
persons who are sojourning in Estonia. The state shall encourage voluntary and 
local government social care. Families with many children and the disabled shall 
be entitled to special care by state and local authorities.” The Constitution also 
stipulated that resident non-citizens would have the right to participate in local 
elections.22 These liberal policies implied that the political consensus on the 
citizenship question was to create a restrictive citizenship policy and 
foreshadowed a protracted period of transition in which many residents would be 
left stateless.
Upon the re-establishment of the Republic of Estonia, the Riikigoku 
(Parliament) re-instated the 1938 Law on Citizenship, as amended in 194023, 
according to which citizenship was extended only to those residents who had 
Estonian citizenship prior to June 16, 1940 and their descendants.24 An 
opportunity to gain citizenship automatically was also given to soviet-era citizens 
who could prove that they supported the national independence movement by 
presenting their Congress of Estonia membership cards.25 This citizenship law 
was still in place for the 1993 national elections, therefore severely restricting the 
number of eligible voters.26 Like Latvia, Estonia adopted the “Law of the 
Republic of Estonia on Aliens” on July 8, 1993, which was very similar to the 
Latvian law on resident non-citizens, in terms of granting constitutional rights 
protection to aliens. However, unlike the Latvian law which guarantees that 
resident non-citizens will not be deported, the Estonian law includes a negative 
incentive for non-citizens to register with the local immigration offices within the 
established time limit or face possible expulsion from the territory of Estonia (Art. 
21.7-8). The 1993 elections resulted in the creation of a predictably right-of- 
center and nationalistic government, dominated by the Fatherland party. And it 
was this parliamentary majority which designed the new citizenship law adopted 
on January 19, 1995.
The 1995 “Law of the Republic of Estonia on Citizenship” sets out nearly 




























































































the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to have described only the Latvian law 
in detail. One notable difference is that there were no special provisions regarding 
the repatriation of Estonian emegres, as was the case in Latvia, and no special 
privileges were given to Latvian or Lithuanian residents. Moreover, the Estonian 
law does not follow the “windows” system, therefore naturalization procedures 
were open to all permanent residents form the date the law came into force (April 
1, 1995). Nevertheless, naturalization proceeded at a snail’s pace: by 1997 only 
1060 applicants had managed to fulfill all the requirements to gain citizenship.27
International Legal Guidelines for Citizenship
The Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930, which states that it is “for each State to 
determine under its own law who are its nationals” (Art. I).28 Yet, international 
law and state practice do indeed provide limits to this right. The Report outlines 
several general principles which should be taken into consideration when faced 
with the problem of citizenship in successor states. The principles relevant to the 
Baltic cases include, prohibition on discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or 
language, the creation of effective links between potential citizens and the state, 
the avoidance of the creation of statelessness, and the right of option for residents 
of successor states to choose their country of citizenship. Although it should be 
understood that adherence to one of these principles should never be a defense 
against ignoring one or all of the other principles delimiting a state’s nationality 
policy, it is useful to show the ways in which one principle may indeed limit 
another and that the standard of application of each principle is determined by the 
particular context and values of each state. Finally, the Baltic States have 
succeeded in defending their citizenship policies by clearly defining their status as 
re-established sates as opposed to successor states.
Anti-discrimination Principle
The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, color, religion, 
language, or political opinions in determining citizenship is a well-recognized 
limitation on a state’s right to determine conditions for acquisition of citizenship. 
Article 1(3) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination stipulates that “nothing in the Convention may be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties 
concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions 
do not discriminate against any particular nationality.” Moreover, Art. 9 of the 
UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits states from depriving 
“any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or 




























































































becomes suspect due to their stiff language requirements and firm stances on not 
granting citizenship to former soviet military personnel. The Latvian law in 
particular seems to single out the ethnic Russian population as unsuitable to gain 
citizenship whereas the soviet era migrants of Estonian and Lithuanian ethnicity 
enjoyed automatic citizenship.
One argument offered in defense of Latvian and Estonian discriminatory 
policies towards resident populations of ethnic Russians is that they serve to 
“correct” 50 years of discrimination of ethnic Estonians and Latvians by Russia. 
Ziemele asserts that “the measures which were undertaken by the independent 
governments of the Baltic States were measures of special protection in the sense 
of Article 26 of the ICCPR aimed at re-establishing de facto  equality for 
discriminated groups in the respective societies which also involved the 
attribution of the status of State language to local languages.”29
The level of fluency required by Latvian and Estonian citizenship 
procedures has been criticized as unreasonable, but the international community 
could do little to persuade the countries to ease their demands. Indeed, most 
states require some working knowledge of the official language of the state prior 
to granting citicenship. Ultimately, the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities recommended exempting the elderly and disabled from taking 
language examinations as well as simplifying the exam for all applicants. In 
response, the exemptions were included in citizenship procedures, but both Latvia 
and Estonia deemed simplification of the language exams unnecessary.30 
Moreover, attempts have been made to grant non-citizens equality under the law, 
in terms of granting resident aliens protection under the constitution, social 
assistance, and limited voting rights.
Effective Link Principle
In response to the allegations that the citizenship laws of Latvia and Estonia 
discriminate on the basis of ethnicity and language, the effective link principle 
was invoked. This principle is derived from the recognition that there must be 
some kind of link between the state and an individual requesting citizenship. 
These links are very often birth, domicile and residence in the country in 
question.31 Yet other criteria can be included as well, particularly in terms of the 
state’s responsibility for defending its citizens against the actions of other states.32 
For these reasons, it is customary that successor states may choose not to grant 
automatic citizenship to individuals who had served in political or military 
capacities of the previous state.33 This principle banished any attempts to criticize 
Baltic citizenship legislation on the grounds that former soviet army, state, or 




























































































ethnic Russians’ claims to be granted citizenship of Latvia and Estonia, 
knowledge of the native language, history, and constitution have been additional 
requirements for naturalization. The assumption is that Russians feel a stronger 
allegiance to Russia rather than to the Baltic States even if they have chosen not 
to live there for economic reasons. Russia has certainly shown concern over the 
status of Russian minorities living in the Baltic States and its constitutionalized 
commitment to promote its interests in the “near abroad” far surpasses any other 
state’s claims on foreign territories. Given the history of Russian aggression in the 
Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia may be justified in demanding that ethnic 
Russians not only break their political ties to Russia, but also demonstrate a 
commitment to their adoptive countries.
Avoidance of Statelessness Principle
The principle of avoiding conditions of statelessness has become hard law since 
the adoption of the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In 
reference to citizenship laws, Art. 8 of the Convention stipulates that State Parties 
“shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him 
stateless.” The fact that 13 percent of residents in Estonia and 28 percent in 
Latvia remain stateless flies in the face of this relatively straightforward principle. 
Moreover, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Art. 24 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, state practice has come 
to require that states grant citizenship to children bom in their territories who 
would otherwise be rendered stateless.35
Right of Option Principle
The right of option gives residents of succession states the right to choose 
between taking citizenship in one of the two (or more) successor states or 
between the successor state and the predecessor state.36 In cases where the option 
of taking the citizenship of the predecessor state is chosen, it is usually coupled 
with the obligation to leave the successor state.37 It might be argued by Estonia 
and Latvia that the current stateless population permanently residing in the 
countries actually chose statelessness because they were given the option of 
gaining automatic citizenship by the Russian Federation. Article 13 (2) of the 
Russian Law on Federation Citizenship, adopted November 28, 1991, states that 
“Persons bom on December 30, 1922, and thereafter, who lost the citizenship of 
the former USSR shall be deemed in Russian Federation citizenship by birth, 
where they were bom on the territory of the Russian Federation, or where either 
parent at the moment of their birth was a citizen of the USSR and was in 
permanent residence on the territory of the Russian Federation.” And, though 




























































































residents to become citizens through naturalization. Moreover, it is state practice 
that the right of option go hand in hand with the principle of effective links, 
whereby nationality is granted by the country which shares the individual’s 
ethnic, linguistic, or religious identity.38 In the Baltic’s case, this would give the 
primary responsibility for extending citizenship to the Russian resident 
populations to the Russian Federation. Yet, the resident non-citizen populations 
have largely chosen to remain in the Baltic States despite their stateless status.
Practice of Granting Nationality Automatically in Cases of State Secession
The practice of granting citizenship to the resident population, that is, that the 
“population goes with the territory” is said to be an international practice, though 
it “is not yet a binding rule of codified international law prescribing the automatic 
acquisition of the nationality of the successor state.”39 In cases where there is a 
successor state and a predecessor state, the rule has been that the successor state 
confers its citizenship to former nationals of the predecessor state habitually 
residing in the successor state, in almost all cases this citizenship is conferred 
automatically,40 though the right of option and effective links principles should 
also be considered. In cases where the predecessor state ceases to exist, as is the 
case of the USSR, successor states are even more strongly compelled by 
international practice to offer automatic citizenship to residents of their territories. 
Article 10 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness gives effect 
to this obligation provides that “Every treaty between Contracting States 
providing for the transfer of territory shall include provisions to secure that no 
person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer . . .  In the absence of such 
provisions a Contracting State to which territory is transferred or which otherwise 
acquires territory shall confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise 
become stateless as a result of the transfer or acquisition.”
The automatic conferment of citizenship to permanent residents of the 
territory of the successor state was followed only by Lithuania. Why did Estonia 
and Latvia diverge from this practice and how did they get away with it? To 
answer this question it is necessary to return to the Baltic “path of independence” 
and examine more closely the principle of state continuity embraced by the Baltic 
States. If Estonia’s original path of seceding from the USSR had been successful, 
the Baltic States would have had to sign a treaty with the USSR and thus be 
subject to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, with all its 
implications for allocating citizenship. But, by asserting their status as continuous 
states, the Baltic States subverted the need to base their independence on a 
secession pact with the USSR, on the basis of international recognition of the 
illegality of their annexation. Following their re-assertions of independent 




























































































recognized.41 And as a consequence, the Baltic States reinstated their inter-war 
citizenship laws, with all the ramifications they had on soviet-era migrants. Thus, 
“these states represent a special case since their claim to be identical with the 
three Baltic States annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 was accepted by the 
international community.”42
As a “special case,” both Latvia and Estonia have been able to forestall 
disciplinary measures made by the international community. Moreover, clear 
attempts were made to bestow special status to stateless residents. These states 
offered protection and responsibility for aliens traveling abroad through the issue 
of non-citizens’ passports. Social and political rights were given to these groups 
as well, even to the extent that non-citizens in Estonia may vote in local elections. 
Indeed these measures were taken to soften the blow (to both the resident non­
citizens as to the disapproving international community) of their restrictive 
policies. Yet these measures are merely a smok-screen for clear discrimination of 
the Russian minority. But with no international law backing, the hands of the 
international community were tied.
In 1997 the Council of Europe drew up the European Convention on 
Nationality in order to give hard-law backing to the general principles and 
international practices concerning nationality. Few states have since signed on to 
the Convention, and none of the three Baltic States have acceded to it.43 
Nevertheless, the Convention provides important new limitations to states’ 
nationality policies. Interestingly, Estonian and Latvian policies towards stateless 
residents have created an important benchmark for citizenship policy which was 
incorporated into the Convention. Article 20 of the Convention requires that in 
cases of state succession, nationals of the predecessor state habitually resident in 
the territory over which sovereignty is transferred to a successor state and who 
have not acquired its nationality shall have the right to remain in that state and 
those persons shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of the successor 
state in relation to social and economic rights. Moreover, resident non-citizens 
may not be excluded from employment in the public sphere.
Human Rights Conditionality in EU Enlargement
While conditionality is not a new international tool for influencing state behavior, 
relative to other developing countries, this tool has strong potential for success in 
the Baltic States for at least two reasons. First, the Baltic States, like other 
postcommunist countries, are in dire need of international finances to support 
reform - both political and economic. Second, the Baltic States have consistently 
asserted their “Western credentials” and the desire to return to Europe. This 




























































































sphere of influence. Thus, even if there are significant cultural differences 
between the Baltic States and Western Europe, there is a strong incentive for 
these differences to be bridged in an effort to increase security.
Despite the Baltic States’ relative willingness to go along with 
conditionality, the effectiveness of this tool is also dependent on donor states’ and 
international institutions’ treatment of conditionality. Peter Burnell has developed 
three questions for donors to ask themselves before offering aid for political 
changes:
First, are they [the donors] convinced the target groups in the aid-receiving world 
know and understand what the donors want, and why they want it? Second, do those 
groups display full confidence in the donors’ qualifications to suggest such advice, and 
if not, would they be justified in developing such a confidence? Third, are there features 
of the operation of political conditionality which, in the reasonable estimation of 
friends, could actually impede the promotion o f good government and democracy, and 
make these pursuits more vulnerable to the indifference and hostility of their detractors 
and enemies?44
Burnell asserts that the strength and effectiveness of the conditionality tool 
depends on how it is used. In terms of the Baltic States, the relative strengths of 
international institutions to credibly employ the conditionality tool becomes quite 
clear. First, it would seem that those institutions in which the Baltic States are 
already members have less to offer in terms of conditionality. Indeed, the 
conditions placed on these countries by the United Nations (UN), the Council of 
Europe (CE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) have largely been met upon entry into the fold. Monitoring and helping 
to enforce treaty obligations would be their main vehicle for promoting change, 
although since the states under scrutiny are also equal voting partners, the rights- 
violating state has a greater advantage in arguing its case than effected groups 
within the state.45 Nevertheless, behind-the-scenes deals seem to be struck 
between institutions and violator-states through funding by third parties (either 
other member states or other international organizations), which seem to 
effectively place “helpful pressure” on problem countries.46
At this point, the EU holds the most leverage in terms of placing human 
rights conditionality on the Baltic States, in view of their applications to join. In 
principle, the rules simple: apply the acquis and association agreements, and EU 
admission will be granted - failure to comply will delay admission and suspend 
aid. Previous EU enlargements also required acceding countries to make political 
and economic adjustments. But the conditions placed on the postcommunist 
countries are higher than ever for two reasons. The rapid expansion of the EU’s 




























































































devastation due to the soviet legacy in Eastern Europe have both contributed to 
widening the gap between East and Western Europe. The three basic 
requirements for membership determined at the European Council meeting in 
Copenhagen are:
• the applicant state must have achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;
• the applicant state must have a functioning market economy with the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the 
Community;
• the applicant state must be able to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of economic and political union.” 47
These seemingly straightforward criteria translate to over 80,000 pages of 
legislation that will need to be adopted prior to accession.48 The vast body of 
legislation derived from the acquis communautaire are presented as ‘objective 
criteria’ to be used to evaluate the ten postcommunist applicant countries. The 
EU created these objective criteria in order to increase the transparency of the 
enlargement process and thus respond to allegations that it has shown favoritism 
to certain countries.49 Nevertheless, each of these countries face different 
challenges and are at different stages of their political and economic transitions. 
Thus, the complexity of the task potentially weakens the conditionality tool since 
the number of criteria is great, monitoring their implementation by the 
Commission is difficult and the return on the investment (accession to the EU) 
seems distant.
To address this weakness, the EU’s Agenda 2000 initiated a new strategy 
which reinforced the conditionality tool. First, those countries that had already 
progressed further in terms of political and economic development were grouped 
as “front-runners” in the enlargement process. The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia were thus rewarded for their strides towards 
democratization and market reform. This was a sizable carrot to those included in 
the first wave and a prominent stick to those that were left out, which created 
incentives for slackers to speed up reforms. Next, through the Accession 
Partnerships, the EU created a separate strategy for each country, complete with 
short- and medium-term goals. Each step taken towards reaching these goals is 
accompanied by promises of financial assistance through PHARE and “catch-up” 
facilities, directly targeting specific reform measures, such as fighting corruption, 
rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting foreign investment. This was a 



























































































adapting an enlargement strategy compatible with each country’s unique strengths 
and weaknesses.
So that there would be no question of its policy, the Council adopted Art. 4 
of Regulation 622/9850 on March 16, 1998 which gives the Commission the 
power to suspend financial assistance if it deems that the country in question is 
not progressing quickly enough, or actually back-pedals in its progress towards 
adopting the acquis. Regulation 622/98 thus legally and institutionally enshrined 
the conditionality tool in the enlargement process.
Progress in keeping up with the short- and medium-term goals of the 
Accession Partnerships is documented in the Regular Reports by the 
Commission. Unlike the Agenda 2000 Opinions and the Accession Partnerships, 
the Reports are extremely detail-oriented summaries of the progress in meeting 
the accession criteria in each country, reflecting the problems met by reformers in 
each of the countries, as well as their achievements. As will be discussed below, 
the Reports allow the EU to make adjustments in its policies to each country 
depending on the rate of its progress in specific areas. Although the time-span 
between the adoption of the Agenda 2000 Opinions and the Regular Reports was 
scarcely more than one year, progress in the acceding countries has been clear, as 
was the EU’s shift in focus on certain rights. Thus, it seems probable that the 
EU’s standards and expectations will increase the better applicant countries 
perform.
Human rights in the European Union
Including requirements for human rights protection in the Association Agreements 
for EU accession is a practical tool for smooth integration of the postcommunist 
democracies into the Union. Western Europe’s commitment to both free market 
principles and open, democratic societies necessitates that newcomers share and 
promote not only economic ideals, but also democratic ones - of which human 
rights protection are an integral part.
Despite their obvious significance, human rights remain a contentious issue 
within the EU, since each member state remains committed to its own unique 
constitutional and ideological tradition. The inclusion of human rights in the 
Treaty of the European Union (TEU) after the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
Intergovernmental Conferences represents a small triumph for the member states 
in overcoming their significant political differences in this field. The absence of 
rights in prior treaties was not a result of their indifference to human rights,51 but 
was due to their inability to decide which rights should be incorporated as guiding 




























































































fact, Art. 13 of the TEU actually reflects the dissonance on human rights among 
the member states. It states: “Without Prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation” (emphasis added). The EU’s irresolute stance is 
symptomatic of its reticence to accept the responsibility of promoting human 
rights within its own borders.
The inability of the EU to create a Human Rights Agenda is another 
consequence of this dissonance. Article 6 of the TEU states the EU is “founded 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States.” The final part of that Article states that the “Union shall provide itself 
with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.” 
Nevertheless, it has not yet introduced new mechanisms for carrying out its 
commitment to promoting rights.52
The ECJ has been an important forum for the EU human rights debate. 
Human rights conflicts have touched on other important EU principles, such as 
supremacy, direct effect, and subsidiarity. Regularly, cases come before the Court 
that raise important human rights issues, but the ECJ has not been completely 
consistent in its approach to these questions. Instead, it’s decisions reflect a 
“push and pull” process in which the Court is “at times [willing] to embrace the 
invitations of those actors [to review member state action under Community 
fundamental rights standards] and at other times, explicitly or implicitly has 
rejected them.”53 The oscillation of the Court stems from the ongoing power 
balance between the EU institutions, on the one hand, and between the EU and its 
member states, on the other. Thus the Court has joined that game as well, 
carefully balancing between protecting and increasing its sphere of competence, 
while carefully maneuvering around delicate relationships with the national courts 
of the member states. An important observation has been made reflecting the 
Court’s interpretation of its competence concerning rights:
“In its jurisprudence, the Court has articulated three critical constitutional principles 
which inform this field. The first affirms that ‘...respect for human rights is a condition 
o f the lawfulness o f Community acts.’ The second affirms that it is the positive duty of 
the institutions ‘...to ensure the observance o f fundamental rights’. In other words, they 
are obligated not simply to refrain from violating them, but to ensure that they are 
observed within the respective constitutional roles played by each institution. Finally, 





























































































The groundwork for and active review of human rights in the EU and its member 
states has thus been laid down, though the ECJ has taken a strong human rights 
stance in only a few cases.55 For now, the role of enforcing and protecting human 
rights primarily falls on the shoulders of the member states, which only serves to 
reinforce the need to include human rights in the preaccession criteria for EU 
membership.
Which Rights are Necessary for EU Accession?
Determining what rights are essential for the creation of a common market and at 
which standard these rights must be protected has been a contentious issue with 
which the EU’s institutions have been grappling. At the same time, while the 
conditionality tool was seen as quite strong in the EU enlargement process, 
human rights constitute only a subsection of the Political Criteria for EU 
accession. To complicate matters, the acquis are in the process of expanding: 
which means that the conditions for accession are in the process of changing as 
well.56 Moreover, the basic Copenhagen conditions are largely declarative57, 
allowing flexibility of interpretation and do not indicate at what standards these 
criteria will be judged. The tools used to measure progress and the standards 
applied in meeting the political and human rights criteria for accession are 
therefore highly subjective.58 In addition to any changes in criteria or evaluation 
standards that might come from the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) 
has taken decisions independently that may further expand the accession 
criteria.59 Although the EP’s role in determining accession criteria is limited, it 
does vote on the accession of new member states, and therefore any decision it 
takes are plausible additions to the already numerous accession criteria.60 
Therefore, evaluating which rights have been included in conditionality 
requirements for aspiring members, what standards are required, how human 
rights protection is measured, and how the EU will ‘punish’ those countries that 
do not comply with those conditions is somewhat problematic.
Putting these complicating factors aside, the TEU offers clues about the 
Commission’s direction in terms of what rights are important to the EU. First, 
Article 6.2 of the TEU clearly states that the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) shall be 
respected by the Union and ratification of the ECHR is part of the acquis. The 
Agenda 2000 cites this article as well, which indicates its importance as a tool for 
evaluating the protection of human rights in acceding countries.61 Nevertheless, 
the ECHR has been deemed by the ECJ as “insufficiently precise” to clearly 
address European rights and demand that they be implemented at a sufficiently 
high standard.62 This has been interpreted to mean that the ECJ considers the 




























































































provide a higher standard of protection to its citizens.63 The ECJ has often quoted 
the end of Art. 6.2 which stipulates that in addition to the ECHR the EU must 
respect rights “as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States,” which also implies a higher standard than that provided for in 
the ECHR. Thus, looking at the conventions to which applicant countries are a 
party is a necessary but insufficient indicator of their readiness to accede to the 
EU.
From the Agenda 2000 Opinions, Accession Partnerships, and Regular 
Reports, I have determined that the EU has focused on three types of rights. My 
groupings do not necessarily overlap with traditional classifications of rights, and 
would probably be clumsy if they were used in another context. Nevertheless, I 
use them here in order to shed light on the EU’s motivations for including certain 
rights over others in its human rights policy in the candidate countries. The first 
group includes rights which are necessary to ensure democratic rule and open 
societies. These democracy guarantees include: access to justice, right to life, 
freedom against arbitrary arrest, right to privacy, freedom of association, freedom 
of expression, and freedom of assembly. These rights and freedoms form the 
basic requirements for democracy: the right to organize politically and participate 
in the political process without repercussions. If these rights and freedoms are in 
place and function properly, then there are no impediments for the society to 
create and protect a shared system of values. For the EU, this category of rights is 
essential first of all for its symbolic significance: democracy is a European value 
and is indeed one of the unifying factors of the alliance. But the second reason for 
including them in the pre-accession criteria is because currently the EU can do 
little to influence human rights standards in the actions of member states.64 
Therefore, securing the framework necessary to help develop a national 
commitment to human rights is essential for any EU member state. This class of 
rights seem to stem from Art. 177.2 of the TEU, which stipulates that 
“Community policy in this area [development cooperation] shall contribute to the 
general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the mle of law, 
and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It is also 
consistent with the requirements for accession in previous enlargements.65
There is little resistance to raising the standards of this group of rights in 
the applicant countries. After all, it was the absence of such rights which drove 
the anti-communist campaigns of the late 1980s. Nevertheless, protecting these 
rights is not unproblematic, first of all because of the weak civil society in these 
countries and second because one of the legacies of the soviet regime is the knee- 
jerk reaction of strengthening the state in order to regain control over unruly 




























































































The second group of rights required by the EU is counter-majoritarian 
rights. This group includes: protection and non-discrimination of ethnic 
minorities, non-citizens, asylum seekers, and children, and freedom of religion. 
For the most part, the Accession Partnerships’ Political Criteria are silent on 
women’s rights and non-discrimination due to race, gender, disability, religion, 
age, or sexual orientation,66 which is a clear EU policy. Yet, the Accession 
Partnerships clearly specify the demand that applicant countries sign and ratify 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM). 
The FCPNM seems to be important since attitudes towards minorities and 
foreigners have important consequences in foreign policy and security. The 
Common Foreign and Security Policy sections of the Opinions concentrate on 
revealing the applicant countries’ good relations with their neighbors which can 
be destroyed easily by ill-treatment of that neighbor’s émigré groups.67 It may 
also be an indication of how receptive these countries will be to the free 
movement of workers and capital after accession.68
This group of rights is somewhat more difficult to sell in postcommunist 
societies, judging from the rise of nationalism and ethnic discrimination 
throughout the region. Although all three constitutions of the Baltic States now 
have clear provisions that promote and protect the rights of national minorities, 
these protections have been shown as insufficient due to the limited power of 
their national institutions. Moreover, the parliamentary system has been the most 
favored system of government throughout the region which, in combination with 
strong nationalism and weak civil society, can be a recipe for majoritarianism.69 
Particularly in the Baltic States, where independence was fought for by arguing 
for national self-determination, and where Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians 
were viewed as second-class citizens by the Russian Diaspora, turning the other 
cheek and adopting liberal policies towards the Russian minority seems unlikely. 
Moreover, France and Belgium have not signed the Convention, which reflects 
these countries’ ideological position in the general debate between valuing 
individual rights over group rights. In addition, the Netherlands, Greece and 
Portugal have failed to ratify this convention.
The final set of rights could be grouped as quality-of-life rights. I chose this 
title not because I believe these rights to be less important than others, but 
because the Commission itself decided to put environmental protection and health 
care under that title instead of placing them in the human rights section.70 I have 
added other rights (from the human rights section of the Opinions) to the quality 
of life rights because these rights have high price tags: the right to social security 
and minimum wage, education, humane prison, army, and refugee camp 
conditions. Also to this group I have included the right to property and the right to 




























































































in acceding countries to EU standards. These rights are primarily socio-economic 
rights, and form the building blocks for market economy building and smooth 
integration into the EU framework. They reflect the Union’s overall objectives as 
they are derived from Art 2 of the TEU. Since most involve hefty government 
expenditures, it is doubtful that these countries would have developed clear 
policies in these fields so early in their economic transitions without EU 
intervention.
The Effect of EU Conditionality in the Baltic States
From the concluding paragraphs of each of the Opinions, it seems as though little 
needs to be done in each country to fulfill the political criteria (see Table X in the 
appendix). In Latvia and Estonia, it seems, minor adjustments need to be made to 
accommodate the Russian-speaking population. The Opinion on Lithuania on the 
other hand, would have us believe that Lithuania has already fulfilled the political 
criteria. These conclusions, however, are hardly compatible with the preceding 
paragraphs which raise many human rights concerns in each of the three 
categories or rights: democratic guarantees, counter-majoritarian rights, and 
quality-of-life rights.
The Commission’s Opinion in the Agenda 2000 identified 14 human rights 
problems in Lithuania. Five of these are problems within the category of 
democracy guarantees: inadequate legal recourse in the courts due to lengthy 
legal proceedings, shortage of lawyers, and absence of procedures for making 
police and other civil servants accountable for their actions; the second stems 
from the first and deals with the inadequacy of the state’s attempts to prosecute 
alleged Nazi war criminals; existence of the death penalty; inadequate protection 
against arbitrary arrest; and inadequate right to privacy. In the category of 
counter-majoritarian rights, four problems were identified: although freedom of 
religion is guaranteed by law, there is inadequate protection against anti-Semitic 
acts; protection of children is lacking in terms of legislation against child 
pornography, child prostitution, and sexual abuse of children; though the rights of 
minorities are constitutionally guaranteed, special rules originally granted to 
ethnic minority parties for entering parliament have been scraped; and gender 
discrimination laws are not adequately implemented. Finally, in terms of quality- 
of-life rights, the Lithuanian government has unnecessarily complicated the 
procedures ensuring the right to strike; has not completed the land register which 
is necessary to assure the right to property; prison conditions are inhumane; the 
health care system needs serious reforms; and serious reforms are necessary in 




























































































The Agenda 2000 Opinion on Latvia’s application isolates 15 human rights 
breaches. Among these, two infringe on democracy guarantees: inadequate legal 
recourse and need to abolish the death penalty. Counter-majoritarian rights are 
the most problematic in Latvia. The eight problems identified in this category are: 
restriction on freedom of religion, inhumane and degrading conditions in asylum 
seekers’ accommodation centers; inadequate protection of children; infringements 
of the rights of minorities to form collective groups; extremely restrictive right to 
citizenship; discrimination against non-citizens; ethnic minority discrimination; 
and non-implementation of gender anti-discrimination laws. Within the category 
of quality-of-life rights, the five problems focused on by the Commission were: 
restriction on property rights of non-citizens; inhumane prison and army 
conditions; and inadequate health care system and environmental protection.
In the case of Estonia, 10 human rights problems were identified in the 
Agenda 2000 Opinion. Breaches of democracy guarantees were identical to those 
identified in Latvia. Within the counter-majoritarian rights category, the four 
identified problems included: the lack of measures to promote the collective rights 
of ethnic minorities; overly-restrictive citizenship laws; discrimination against 
non-citizens; and gender anti-discrimination laws are not implemented. Finally, 
the four problems identified in the quality-of-life category were: restrictions of the 
right to property; inhumane prison conditions; inadequate health care system; and 
the need to bolster environmental protection.
While the Agenda 2000 was successful in exploring the unique problems of 
each of the applicant countries and their specific contexts, the Accession 
Partnerships seem to indicate a return by the Commission to promoting uniform 
“objective criteria” in each of the three countries. The Commission’s 
concentration on a small set of rights seems to reflect their greater significance in 
the EU context relative to the other rights problems presented in the Opinions. 
The Accession Partnerships required all three countries to improve border 
management and the conditions of refugee reception facilities; improve the 
operation of the judicial system, implement migration policy and asylum 
procedures, fight against organized crime including trafficking of human beings, 
enforce equal opportunities between women and men, improve public health 
standards, strengthen environmental protection measures, and continue raising the 
standard of the right to property. In the Latvian and Estonian cases, measures 
must also be taken to promote integration of national minorities and facilitate the 
naturalization of non-citizen residents. An additional requirement was placed 
specifically on Estonia to reform its pension program. The Accession Partnerships 
indicate that the most important rights problems are in the fields of counter- 
majoritarian and quality-of-life rights, while no mention is made of problems in 




























































































development in EU financial assistance in democracy projects which seems to 
show that there is still work to be done in that field. While had previously 
channeled a mere 1 percent of the PHARE budget to the Democracy 
Programme,71 the EU will increase PHARE assistance in institution building 
(which involves the strengthening of democratic institutions, rule of law, etc.) to 
30 percent of the PHARE budget.
By contrast, the Regular Reports by the Commission not only continue to 
mention problems and developments in all three human rights categories, but the 
standard of evaluation of certain rights has actually been raised. This is best 
demonstrated in the Lithuanian case: in the Agenda 2000 Opinion, the position of 
asylum seekers was deemed to be satisfactory, while in the Regular Report, a 
detailed critique of foreigner registration center conditions and refugee admission 
procedures appears. Another example of this is the Opinions’ positive evaluation 
of the freedom of association in both Lithuania and Estonia on the one hand, and 
the Commission’s comment that the NGO sectors in each country are not 
growing rapidly enough due to the low level of public information. However, if 
education of the public is to blame, it would hardly be logical to conclude that the 
public was better educated in 1997 than in 1998 about associations and NGOs. 
Both examples show that the EU’s standards of evaluation have increased.
But the most important revelation of the Regular Reports is the dramatic 
progress made by the applicant countries in responding to the criticisms of the 
Agenda 2000 Opinions. Perhaps the most impressive performance was given by 
Latvia. First, although it was not an explicit requirement by the EU, the Latvian 
Parliament adopted a constitutional amendment which incorporated a bill of rights 
in the Satversme (Constitution). Previously, the “Rights and Duties of Citizens” 
existed as a regular law, with no method to check whether other legislation or 
state actions comply with it. Next, in spite of its controversial nature, the 
Parliament managed to adopt a new citizenship law which was subsequently 
upheld in a national referendum. As a result, the “window system” (which 
differentiated by age those who could apply for citizenship every year) was 
abandoned and the naturalization process was opened to all resident non-citizens. 
Also, modifications to the citizenship law were made to enable children bom in 
Latvia to stateless parents to be granted citizenship and the procedures for 
naturalization for people over the age of 65 were simplified. Moreover, the 
Latvian government responded to the Opinion’s criticism of its discriminatory 
policies towards non-nationals by eliminating restrictions preventing non-citizens 
from working as fire-fighters, airline staff, pharmacists, and veterinary 
pharmacists and unemployment benefits will now be available to non-citizens 
without their having to present certificates that they know the Latvian language. 
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Lithuania has also demonstrated some progress in the weak areas identified 
in the Agenda 2000 Opinion. In response to the call for improvements of the 
judicial system, several administrative changes were instituted, the preventative 
detention law was replaced with a more liberal “Law on Crime Prevention” 
which also includes clear guidelines regarding search and seizure which offer 
greater protection of the right to privacy, and another new law was introduced to 
increase the accountability of law enforcement and judicial officers. A law on the 
protection of children’s rights was adopted - which is in line with the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child - and an Ombudsman for the protection of 
Children’s rights was established. Another Ombudsman was established to 
oversee implementation of the gender anti-discrimination law.
Some improvements have been initiated in Estonia, although progress 
reports are coupled with further criticisms and improvement requirements, 
indicating a heightened standard of evaluation most likely due to Estonia’s greater 
proximity to accession than the other two Baltic States. In March, 1998 the death 
penalty was abolished and Protocol 6 of the ECHR was ratified. Ongoing 
progress in the restructuring of the police and judiciary was recorded as well. But 
in the field of counter-majoritarian rights, little progress was demonstrated and it 
will remain to be seen if the EU will take any measures to punish Estonia’s non 
compliance at future stages of evaluation. For now, Estonia will still receive the 
same PHARE funding to promote human rights improvements as Lithuania and 
Latvia.
Despite the EU’s many problems with creating a comprehensive human 
rights agenda, it has been able to create and effectively promote a human rights 
policy in the Baltic States through conditionality in three areas: democracy 
guarantees, counter-majoritarian measures, and quality-of-life rights. Even in the 
course of one year, the three Baltic States have shown dramatic efforts to respond 
to the specific criticisms and concerns elaborated in the Agenda 2000 Opinions. 
Moreover, it is important to note that since the Agenda 2000, all three countries 
have signed and ratified the FCPNM. Perhaps the “stick” of being excluded from 
the first round of accession negotiations has prompted Lithuania and especially 
Latvia to push through reforms more quickly than Estonia. Nevertheless, all three 
countries have been issued a sizable “carrot” to promote further development of 





























































































The oscillation between the EU’s positive evaluation of the political and 
human rights criteria on the one hand, and its increasing standards for rights 
protection in the Baltic states seems to reflect the need for diplomacy when 
promoting human rights outside EU borders. This need stems from the weakness 
of the EU to influence - let alone harmonize - the standards of rights protection in 
its member states. Thus, by stating that Lithuania, for example, has fulfilled the 
political criteria, the EU covers itself from accusations of imposing a double 
standard. Nevertheless, critiques and requirements for improvements in the field 
of human rights continue and the standards of evaluation have actually risen with 
time and progress. Though highly speculative and difficult to prove, it is worth 
considering other effects of this policy. By demanding a high standard of 
protection and collectivization of minority rights, might the EU also be provoking 
change in the UK, Belgium and France, where individual rights have priority?72 A 
better example is the demand that Latvia and Estonia simplify the procedures for 
granting citizenship to children bom in the territory to non-citizen residents. Is it 
just coincidence that Germany recently adopted similar procedures as well? If 
there is a link, then the success of the enlargement project will be two-fold: not 
only will rights be promoted in the applicant countries in the East, but it might 
well influence member state behavior as well.
If the EU is serious about its requirements to incorporate the stateless 
residents in Estonia and Latvia into their societies as citizens, there would be little 
to hold them back from signing the European Convention on Nationality, since 
the ‘toughest’ new standards included in that agreement are in line with their 
policies on granting long-time residents rights almost equal to those of citizens. 
This may in time compel countries with large resident-alien communities such as 
Germany to do the same. Moreover, if, for instance resident-alien communities 
residing in EU member states acquire limited political rights, such as the Russian 
community’s rights to vote in local elections in Narva, this may in turn lead to 
rethinking the concept of EU citizens and expanding EU citizenship to long-time 
residents - that is third country nationals, or at least granting them equal free- 
movement rights as enjoyed by EU citizens73.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the difficulty with which the international community has 
attempted to influence change in the Baltic States’ policies on citizenship and the 
protection of national minorities. The inability of organizations such as the OSCE 
and the Council of Europe to reverse discriminatory policies in the Baltic States 
was due to the lack of progress in international law since the end of WWII 
regarding nationality policy. Only after the failure of international law to offer a 




























































































speed with contemporary values which strive to raise the principle of non­
discrimination above nationalist sentiments.
The great success of the EU enlargement process in promoting change in 
the Baltic States’ policies, not only towards the Russian minority but also in 
terms of other human rights, stems from an effective use of conditionality. With 
the promise of accession, the Baltic States sought to remedy the condition of 
statelessness in their territories and abandoned discriminatory policies. Despite 
the fact that certain EU member states have not signed it, all three Baltic States 
have ratified the FCPNM. The fact that applicant countries are complying with 
relatively high human rights criteria prior to accession will surely raise the 
standard of human rights protection in the EU and create a foundation for the EU 
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